

Recommendations for the EU trading directive from an economic viewpoint

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Structure of presentation

- The international climate regime after Marrakech
- EU climate policy challenges
- Evaluation of the draft directive from an economist's viewpoint
- Outlook



The general framework of the international climate regime

- Targets weakened considerably by new sinks, probably by about 3 percentage points
- Supply of hot air likely to be higher than demand, if U.S. stays out
- Project based mechanisms are squeezed out under a competitive market
- If hot air sellers reduce supply to maximise revenues, project-based mechanisms can play a role, but are always at the mercy of hot air sellers

The general framework of the international climate regime II

- Full fungibility and banking, thresholds can be circumvented
- Institutional framework rather strict
- Reporting becomes crucial to be eligible for the mechanisms
- Compliance penalty acts as deterrent

Prices will be much lower
than anticipated



The global GHG market

| | |
|---|--|
| Necessary emissions reduction compared to BAU (without USA) | 1000 Mt CO ₂ |
| "Hot Air" (Cartel?) | up to 1100 Mt CO ₂ |
| JI and Emissions Trading | 400 Mt CO ₂ |
| CDM | 100 Mt CO ₂ |
| | 350 Mt CO ₂ |
| Price per t CO ₂ | 1 ? Grey market: 1-3 € |

If all Hot Air was put on the market,
the price would be ZERO!



EU climate policy challenges

- Good luck from German reunification and UK coal to gas conversion comes to an end
- Transport emissions rising everywhere
- Steeply rising emission trends in cohesion countries
- Nuclear phase out in Germany is a challenge for the second commitment period
- Lack of joint policy instruments leads to strongly differing stringency of national climate policies
- Government changes jeopardise future progress (Denmark, Italy)



The EU draft directive from an economists' viewpoint I

- **Broad coverage of emissions** 😊
 - **Mandatory** participation avoids free riding 😊
 - Only **large** installations, exclusion of **chemical and non-ferrous metal** sector (46% covered), **CO₂ only** ☹️
 - a **hybrid downstream (industry) and upstream (transport + households)** system would have been preferable
 - **closed** installations should **not** get further allocations of permits
- **Strong verification rules** 😊
 - Clear verification procedure
- **Strong sanctions** 😊
 - High level penalty



The EU draft directive from an economists' viewpoint II

- **Avoidance of competitive distortions** 😊
 - **absolute** emissions targets are a good base as they do not give an incentive for **production growth** 😊
 - **harmonisation of allocation rules** which however remain **unclear** and even **contradictory** ☹️
 - **definition of base year, early action** and treatment of **new entrants** lacks ☹️
 - **grandfathering** at least until 2008 ☹️
 - a better solution would have been **compulsory auctioning** - at least for a **part** of permits (hybrid) to get an **early price signal**
 - define base year **late enough** to have **good data** but before **start of discussion on emissions trading** - 2000 appropriate



The EU draft directive from an economists' viewpoint III

- **Early and long-term incentives** 😊
 - Start in **2005** allows **learning** for commitment period
- **Integration in the international market** ☹️
 - **no acceptance** of **CDM and JI credits** (possibly later), leading to a price differential
 - **CDM credits should be accepted from the beginning**
 - *If there are fears of importing low-quality permits, one can demand extra safeguards for project additionality and baseline calculation*



Outlook

- With the draft trading directive, the EU is a **pioneer** in developing creative climate policy instruments
- **Avoid the standoff** that characterised the debate on the CO₂/energy tax
- Retain the **mandatory character** of the scheme despite industry opposition; otherwise demand coverage of **non-participants** by **equivalent** instruments (emissions tax or upstream system, not voluntary agreement). **Avoid** a **subsidy-based regime** (bad example: UK)



Outlook II

- If auctioning is impossible, **benchmarking** avoids subsidisation of high emitters and also takes **early action** into account
- Aim for **close integration** into the **international regime** via utilisation of the **Kyoto Mechanism**; this **alleviates fears** of a **high-price regime**
- Try to integrate the **other gases** for specific **large-scale processes** (nitric acid, aluminium production)
- Trading can help to **avoid an unravelling** of EU climate policy due to new challenges



Thank you!

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